Connecting Contexts

The great medieval philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas, has a great deal to contribute to today’s debate regarding the nature and relationship of faith and reason.  Dialogue on the issue is particularly necessary since, as Brother Benignus remarks, “Today, superficially, religious faith seems to be on the defensive, threatened by reason…”[i] Even when Benignus was writing, in 1947, it seemed that faith was on the defensive.  Today, especially with the contributions of the so-called New Atheists, faith seems to be under greater attack.  Aquinas’ value comes because many of the propositions he was responding to have analogues within today’s debate on the topic.  As such, Aquinas gives a powerful account of faith and reason that must be engaged in today’s debate.  Indeed, many have engaged with Aquinas, and the debate has moved in novel directions.  Francis Parker frames the value of Aquinas in the current situation well,

…I take [Aquinas] to be the greatest synthesizer of reason and faith and the greatest advocate of both of them as united that the western world has known.  It should be confessed, however, that a complete return to the age of Aquinas is today impossible, at least for me.  Much as I prize, even envy St. Thomas’ synthesis, too much water has gone over the falls of modernity for us to be able to return it all to its original reservoir.[ii]

This indicates that while the current debate has moved beyond Aquinas, his thought would still be a legitimate and important place to start.

In order to apprehend Aquinas’ view of faith and reason and judge how it may be useful for today, one must first understand the milieu in which he was writing.  Once this is complete, it is possible to take a brief look at the contemporary condition and relate it to the state of affairs during Aquinas’ time.  This shows some important corollaries indicative of the general relevance of Aquinas for today.  These relevancies form the justification for future projects by this author.  However, it seems in light of Parker’s comments above that the result will merely provide a starting point for further thought rather than be an answer in itself.  Providing a basis for this starting point, that is, showing that Aquinas was dealing with similar issues in his time to the issues faced today is the objective of this essay.  The similarity of these issues together with the depth of Aquinas thought provide a value to Aquinas that many today overlook.  Indeed, Copleston puts it well regarding the value of Aquinas, “His opinions, like those of any other philosopher, are open to criticism; but he was far from being a woolly-minded individual who based his philosophy on ‘hunches’ and had recourse to rhetoric to support their validity.”^[iii]

In the case of the connecting Aquinas to the situation today, there are two contexts to review.  First, it is necessary to examine the backdrop to Aquinas’ writing, his historical context, in order to understand the context behind the questions he was dealing with.  This is part of an important hermeneutical maxim; one cannot fully understand a thinker’s work without understanding the questions a thinker is investigating.  Since Aquinas followed the scholastic method of arranging this work into topics and articles that give and answer specific questions, it is relatively easy to identify the questions he was answering.[iv] However, looking at his questions without the context that raised those questions misses some important elements.  What historical context can give then is a sense of the nature and scope of the problems that generated the questions.  The nature and scope reveals a fundamental fracture between those with an orientation toward faith and those with an orientation toward reason.

In addition, this essay will be looking at these fractures on more of a popular level of controversy than on the level of academic controversy.  The academic controversies of Aquinas’ time revolved around such subjects as the eternity of the world and whether or not humanity shares a single intellect, among others.  To a certain extent, these issues represent the important focus and content of the debates that actively engaged Aquinas’ writing and concerns.  With such a deeper level of engagement in mind, there was also a level in which Aquinas’ opponents distilled and disseminated such academic claims as short propositions.  These propositions would have been the medieval equivalent of sound bites and bumper stickers.  The radicals of Aquinas’ day would have been incorporated such propositions into their classroom discussions.  Ultimately, it was propositions that were condemned by Bishop Tempiers and received a great deal of attention.

This has a direct bearing on the second contextual issue, that of contemporary context.  Today, academic debates also revolve around deep issues that seldom play out in their full depth as part of popular culture.  Just as the medieval thinkers found their controversies distilled into propositions, so also today we find claims distilled into short statements that receive a lot of attention.  Of course, if Aquinas really is relevant today, then similarities regarding the contextual issues of his time, especially the condemned propositions, and today’s issues would be expected.  It turns out that some of the contemporary statements bear a striking resemblance to propositions condemned by Bishop Tempier.  Thus, there is a case for the continued relevance of Aquinas as someone who has and can still speak into issues of faith and reason.

 

Historical Context

Thomas Aquinas lived from 1224/25 to 1274 C.E.[v] He was born into a noble family, the counts of Aquino, studied at the Benedictine Abby of Monte Cassino, followed by studies in liberal arts at the University of Naples in 1239.  There he was introduced to the Dominican order and joined them in 1244, against the wishes of his family.  The order sent him to the University of Paris and later to study with the Dominicans in Cologne under Albert the Great from 1248 to 1252.[vi] His theological education received its capstone through a return to the University of Paris, which, according to Jan Aertsen, was “then the intellectual center of Christendom.”[vii] Indeed, Schachner comments that “No education was complete without a sojourn in Paris; the roster of its graduates was a complete list of all the great minds of Europe, of Popes and Kings and Princes, spiritual and temporal.”[viii] This final education lasted from 1252 to 1256, followed by a period teaching at the University of Paris from 1256 to 1259.[ix] Between 1259 and 1269, Aquinas taught at several locations in Italy before returning to the University of Paris, where he taught as Magister regens in theology until 1272, when he left to set up a school of theology in Naples.[x]

It is contextually important to note that Aquinas spent three significant periods in his life either studying or teaching at the University of Paris.  His association with the University of Paris was to the point that the University wrote to the Dominican Chapter in Lyons in 1274 asking for his bones and any unfinished works.[xi] This is important because the University of Paris, as the most prominent University in the late medieval period was the location where faith and reason collided in the thirteenth century.  Because of this, there are many aspects of Aquinas’ work that deal directly with issues derived form the debate on the subject at the University of Paris.  This culminated in Aquinas’ publication of two works during his second professorship that take sides regarding some of the heresies, De aeternitae mundi and De unitate intellectus.[xii] With Aquinas’ intimate association with the University of Paris and his publications of works that deal with issues raised there both directly and indirectly, this historical sketch will focus primarily on what was happening at the University of Paris in the thirteenth century.  This will involve explication of the root of the problem followed by an examination of select propositions condemned by the Papal Legate that represent some of the ideas that Aquinas was reacting against.  This will give sufficient information to compare Aquinas’ context to contemporary context.

Circa the twelfth century C.E., there was a new “Philosophical Revolution.”[xiii] This revolution was due to the rediscovery of the works of Aristotle.  Steven Marrone calls this “Perhaps the most significant single event associated with the ripening of civilization….”[xiv] It has also been referred to as the “Twelfth century Renaissance” and saw many social, economic, and academic changes.[xv] This was a period of relatively rapid knowledge growth.  Much of Greek science and philosophy had been lost and what remained was difficult to find.  This was so much so that Schachner remarks, “It is almost impossible for the modern mind to visualize the paucity of that knowledge and the tremendous efforts required to attain it.”[xvi] The rediscovery, translation into Latin, and distribution of Aristotle’s works therefore transformed the state of human knowledge in Western Europe, both greatly expanding it and making it easier to obtain.

There had been translations of Aristotle’s Categories, but it was only recently in Aquinas’ time that the entirety of Aristotle’s works were translated into Latin.[xvii] The earliest translations of Aristotle into Latin occurred in the sixth century C.E. with Boethius’ translations of Categories, De interpretatione, Prior Analytics, Topics, and Sophistical Refutations.[xviii] The second wave of translations was from James of Venice in the twelfth century with Posterior Analytics, Physics, and De anima.[xix] The final wave occurred in the thirteenth century with Michael Scot’s nearly complete translation of Metaphysics and Robert Grosseteste’s translation of Nicomachean Ethics.[xx] Knowledge of the full breadth of the works of Aristotle was a new revelation for medieval scholars, casting fresh light on the world and on philosophical issues.[xxi] The twelfth and thirteen centuries also saw the translation of major Arab thinkers such as Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicenna, Algazel, Averroes, and the Jewish thinker Moses Maimonides.[xxii] Since these were very philosophical works, it required Christian thinkers to engage using philosophy.  Marrone puts it well, stating, “If religion was to attain its full intellectual dignity, theologians had to be conversant with all that the mind could know, no matter what the source.”[xxiii] Philosophy was therefore put to work in service of theology as a handmaiden or “ancilla theologiae.”[xxiv]

Exposure to these philosophical works called into question the relationships between philosophy and theology as well as faith and reason, requiring interaction by Christian thinkers.  There was a tension between two existing cultural forms.  One focused on monastic rhythms of liturgy, devotion, and meditation, while the other centered on a new passion for inquiry and analysis applied to everything.[xxv] This was due to this new influx of the empirical thought of Aristotle challenging the previous reign of the idealistic thought of Plato.  Marrone puts this shift into perspective, stating, “Plato, or any teaching attributable to him, was practically unassailable for most of the twelfth century.  In the thirteenth, the secular guide to truth par excellence was Aristotle, ‘The Philosopher.’”[xxvi] Since Augustine had relied heavily on Plato and neo-Platonism to inform the philosophical aspects of his theology, and Augustine was the dominant theologian, this required fundamental shifts in how theologians used philosophy to support theology.  John Wippel points out, “As more and more of these previously unknown philosophical sources began circulating in the West, it was inevitable that Christian thinkers would have to react to and absorb this new learning.”[xxvii] The difficulty was that Aristotelianism was one of the first intellectual alternatives to Christianity.  In his works, Aristotle articulates a full-bodied worldview that as such owed no debt to Christianity and stood on its own as a viable alternative.[xxviii] Thus, philosophy was struggling to come out on its own, and no longer be ancilla theologiae – a mere handmaiden to theology.

Many of Aquinas’ contemporaries embraced Aristotelianism uncritically, while Aquinas intellectually engaged it, adapting Aristotle as he saw fit.  His genius is not reducible to merely his most influential sources, but he did retain some Platonic elements and held Augustine in high esteem.[xxix] His adaptive method seems to be to keep some core Platonic concepts and basic Augustinian theology intact while rearticulating it in Aristotelian terms.  In adapting and innovating using the philosophy of Aristotle, Aquinas’ contemporaries considered him an advanced thinker.[xxx] He differed from them in that he was not interested in Aristotle’s philosophy as such so much as how he could use Aristotle’s philosophy to strengthen and support Christianity.  Aquinas adopted what was valid and well supported in Aristotle and rejected what was incompatible with Christianity.[xxxi] As Copleston points out, “…Aquinas, while utilizing Aristotelianism, rethought it critically in the process of building up his own synthesis and of showing the harmony between theology and philosophy.”[xxxii]

However, as Marrone points out, “So radical a shift in educated attitudes and interests, and so massive an infusion of learning from foreign sources, could hardly avoid provoking opposition.”[xxxiii] This began with many scholars taking a more syncretistic approach regarding Aristotle and Christianity.  There was an initial enthusiastic reception of Aristotle, however by the year 1210 the Charter of the University of Paris prohibited some of the works of Aristotle, stating, “Neither the books of Aristotle on natural philosophy nor their commentaries are to be read at Paris in public or secret, and this we forbid under penalty of excommunication.”[xxxiv] The same condemnation also ordered the excommunication of David of Dinant and burning of his works.[xxxv] This excommunication was rather serious and harsh, including orders for degradation and life imprisonment for the living and disinterment and desecration for those posthumously excommunicated.[xxxvi] In spite of this state of affairs, students were encouraged to read the books after acquiring the Masters in Arts, and private discussion was not discouraged.[xxxvii]

The Faculty of Arts observed this prohibition until circa 1240, following an order in 1231 that the works of Aristotle be “expurgated” since the Papacy recognized some good in the works.[xxxviii] However, the Papacy also made it clear that some sections of Aristotle should be excluded, stating to “entirely exclude what you shall find there erroneous or likely to give scandal or offense to readers….”[xxxix] This allowed lecturing and discussion of Aristotle to gradually increase, until circa 1250 the works of Aristotle were firmly entrenched within the University.  This entrenchment, by 1255, extended to the point that reading the entire known corpus of Aristotle and attending lectures was a requirement of all students.[xl] By the 1260’s and 1270’s general respect for the work of Aristotle and other philosophers had become a full-fledged heterodox syncretism with Christian belief.  This prompted Bishop Stephen Tempier of Paris in 1270 and again in 1277 to prohibit a number of propositions and articles spawned by this movement.[xli] Aquinas was writing in opposition to this Radical Aristotelian movement in Paris.[xlii]

It is important to examine the condemned propositions in order to draw parallels between Aquinas’ time-period and today.  In light of the discussion of faith and reason, some of the propositions condemned in 1277 are particularly notable.  One example is “Only the philosophers are the wise men of this world,”[xliii] thereby lifting philosophers over theologians.  Another is that “…the Christian law impedes one from learning,”[xliv] thereby denigrating the value of theology and claiming that Christianity is opposed to knowledge growth.  This denigration finds further support in propositions stating: “One knows nothing more when one knows theology”;[xlv] “The statements of the theologian are based on fables”;[xlvi] and “That fables and falsities are present in the Christian Law as in others.”[xlvii] Aquinas himself specifically pushes back against those at the University of Paris who claim that those in one of the mendicant orders (such as Franciscans and Dominicans) are incapable of teaching because of their religious way of life.[xlviii] The common thread through these particular propositions and attitudes is that Christian theology is inferior to secular philosophy as a way of knowing.  In other words, the Radical Aristotelians thought that it was possible to know truth through secular philosophy that was unattainable through Christian theology.  Further, they thought that when an individual accepted the truth of Christian theology, this truth was so opposed to secular philosophy that no further knowledge apprehension was possible.

Not only were the doctrinal and intellectual underpinnings of Christianity under assault, but the social mores and elements of Christian praxis as well.  These include, as stated by Whippel, “That one should not pray (202-180), or that one should not confess one’s sins except for the sake of appearances (203-179), or that simple fornication (between an unmarried man and an unmarried woman) is not a sin (205-183)… .”[xlix] Many secular teachers at the University of Paris attacked the praxis of their mendicant fellows, especially time in prayer, silence, and taking confessions.  The common theme in these propositions is Christian praxis as unnecessary or even with inherent irrational moral elements.

It is not possible to know with certainty the sources that prompted the prohibition of these propositions, since many of the original sources have not survived and others are simply unidentified.[l] However, it seems that such condemned propositions must reflect the intellectual attitude at the University of Paris, otherwise there would be no use in making these prohibitions.  These propositions show that the core of Christian doctrine was under attack by the radical Aristotelians, as well as an attitude that the only way to knowledge is through Aristotelian philosophy.  Therefore, it seems that the entire worldview of Christianity was under sustained attack for a significant amount of time.  This essentially constitutes a sort of ‘culture war’ centered on the University of Paris.

This historical overview allows connection with today’s academic and social climate.  During Aquinas’ time, there was a battle over the intellectual and cultural influence of Christianity.  There were three responses to Aristotelianism: an uncritical acceptance and syncretism with Christianity, an attempt to blot out the movement and return to pre-Aristotelian modes of thought, and an attempt at appropriation and innovation using Aristotle without sacrificing orthodoxy.  The attack of the Radical Aristotelians went to the core of Christian intellectual life.  The propositions involved in this attack include three broad categories of claims.  First, that the Christian conception of God is unfounded.  Second, that Christianity as a whole is irrational and stands in opposition to the growth of intellectual knowledge.  Third, that the social mores and practices of Christianity are unnecessary.  This is the nature of the rift present in Aquinas’ time.  Unlike today, the breadth of this rift was local to the University of Paris rather than being widespread throughout society.  However, due to the prestige of the University of Paris and the relative newness of the university system the controversies at the University of Paris encompassed a sizable portion of academia.  In addition, recalling the comment by Schachner, Paris had a great deal of influence upon the elite in medieval society by training kings, popes, and other persons of prominence.[li] While having differences from today’s situation, this combination of academic influence and dispersion of ideas among society’s elite yields a situation with important similarities to today.  There is similarity regarding ideas that are pervading academia and disseminating into society.

Contemporary Context

It would be possible to write a book entirely on the topic of the recent history of the debate on faith and reason.  Therefore, for the purpose of this essay, the nature and scope of contemporary contexts must be quite narrow.  To do otherwise would be to risk losing the voice of Thomas Aquinas amidst the cacophony of contemporary thought.  This would thus miss the opportunity to explore Aquinas’ thought in itself with an eye toward contemporary concerns.  With this end, a handful of twentieth and twenty-first century thinkers are identified who best mirror the sort of propositions encountered by Aquinas at the University of Paris.  This mix consists of H.L. Mencken and Bertrand Russell writing in the early part of the twentieth century, Michael Martin writing in the late twentieth century, and Christopher Hitchens, Sam Harris, and Richard Dawkins writing in the early twenty-first century.  While this mix does leave a gap in the middle of the twentieth century, it nonetheless seems to be a reasonably adequate representative pool of anti-religious thought from the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

The areas of attack that are most relevant to the issue of faith and reason are the ideas that the Christian conception of God is unfounded and that Christianity as a whole is irrational, standing against intellectual knowledge.  The early twentieth century, saw a great deal of criticism of Christians of many denominations and outlooks.  Skeptics criticized Christians along much the same lines as the criticism seen in Paris in the thirteenth century.  H.L. Mencken wrote a polemic against evangelicals in 1925 in the American Mercury magazine stating, “What one mainly notices about these ambassadors of Christ, observing them in the mass, is their colossal ignorance.  They constitute, perhaps, the most ignorant class of teachers ever set up to lead a civilized people….”[lii] This constitutes a type of rhetoric of ignorance that seems to have gotten quite a foothold among academics, particularly in America and Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century.  However, Mencken also applied this rhetoric of ignorance to more than just evangelicals and fundamentalists.  Consider the following,

There are undoubtedly many shrewd fellows among the Catholic clergy, and there are many more who are charming and amusing, but the church as a church, like any other ecclesiastical organization, is highly unintelligent.  It is forever making thumping errors, both in psychology and in politics….[liii]

Here Mencken applies his claim of ignorance to the Catholic Church, but he goes further in making the sweeping claim that all ecclesiastical constructs are inherently unintelligent.  This means Mencken applies his rhetoric of ignorance universally to the Christian Church as a whole.  It is not merely evangelicals and fundamentalists who he believes are ignorant, but all Christian denominations, including Catholics and mainline protestant denominations such as Lutherans, Presbyterians, Methodists, and Baptists.

The philosopher Bertrand Russell, a contemporary of Mencken, paralleled Mencken in many ways leveling a similar criticism in 1927.  He states, “[The church] is in its major part an opponent still of progress and improvement in all the ways that diminish suffering in the world….”[liv] Again, this is a universal claim that the Christian church as a whole is inherently detrimental to human knowledge growth and impedes positive social transformation.  Russell continues this line of attack against the intelligibility of religion in 1930, disputing religion in general, and Christianity in particular.  He remarks, “The intellectual objection is that there is no reason to suppose any religion true….”[lv] Here Russell broadens his critique to all religion rather than confining his criticism merely to Christianity.  It is important to note that he frames this as the intellect attesting against religion.  In addition, Russell was famous for criticizing basic tenets of Christian doctrine and morality.  In particular, he has criticized Christian doctrines such as that of sin, stating, “Those who have a scientific outlook on human behavior, moreover, find it impossible to label an action as “sin”….”[lvi] This is merely one component of Russell’s specific attacks against the intelligibility of Christian doctrine and praxis.  Thus, the types of comments coming from Mencken were not isolated but were the beginning of a torrent of such comments in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

Other thinkers take up the mantel left by Mencken and Russell.  Michael Martin is important because he tones down the rhetoric to a great degree but makes and addresses similar points using philosophic argumentation.  He therefore represents a highly philosophical branch of criticism that is nevertheless similar to that found in Mencken, Russell, later writers, and, importantly, the Radical Aristotelians at the University of Paris in the thirteenth century.  In 1990, Michael Martin examined different conceptions of faith and reason.[lvii] His thesis regarding these conceptions was that they all fail, stating, “Although not all theories of faith have been examined here, the ones that were are representative enough to give us confidence that all such arguments will fail.”[lviii] Martin’s philosophical analysis thus ends with a conclusion that it is impossible to reconcile faith and reason.  Reason therefore has no part in faith and faith then cannot be reasonable.  This amounts to a highly philosophical way of maintaining the ignorance of faith.  In spite of Martin’s criticism of faith and reason, it is notable that he seems to have great respect for Aquinas, stating, “Because there is an attempt to guide faith by reason, this view of faith has decided advantages over some more recent ones.”[lix] However, Martin maintains that Aquinas falls short, stating, “Nevertheless, Aquinas’ view is unacceptable.”[lx] Martin therefore makes a complex argument that takes Aquinas seriously but rejects Aquinas’ synthesis of faith and reason.  He may be making a philosophical argument, but his statement is similar to others as he states, “My object is to show that atheism is a rational position and that belief in God is not.”[lxi] Like the others, he is ultimately claiming that religious views are irrational.

This rhetoric of ignorance and its philosophical justification were present in the twentieth century and persist into the twenty-first century.  The most recent culminations of this are Richard Dawkins’ book, The God Delusion, Christopher Hitchens’ book God is not Great, and Sam Harris’ book The End of Faith.  Among Dawkins’ remarks in The God Delusion is a comment about Christianity that, “It subverts science and saps the intellect.”[lxii] Here, Dawkins is making the claim that Christianity keeps adherents from effectively participating in endeavors that further human knowledge growth.  He is effectively claiming that Christians cannot effectively engage in scientific or intellectual pursuits.  Hitchens claims that, “The person who is certain, and who claims divine warrant for his certainty, belongs to the infancy of our species.”[lxiii] Here, Hitchens is making a claim that it is infantile to have the kind of certainty in God’s existence professed by people of faith.  In effect, Hitchens is claiming that such certainty is impossible, and it is a sheer intellectual oversimplification to claim it.  Harris writes that his goal in writing is to

[C]lose the door to a certain style of irrationality. … Forsaking all valid sources of information about this world (both spiritual and mundane), our religions have seized upon ancient taboos and prescientific fancies as though they held ultimate metaphysical significance. … In the best case, faith leaves otherwise well-intentioned people incapable of thinking rationally about many of their deepest concerns; at worst, it is a continuous source of human violence.[lxiv]

This quote captures a great deal of the shape and tenor of the rhetoric of ignorance promulgated by this batch of thinkers.  Harris is claiming that religion is irrational, that all religions ignore what he considers the best sources of information about the universe, that religions focus on ancient myths and taboos as a concrete basis for universal truth, and that religion ultimately stops thinking processes at the surface level while promoting violence.  These claims are quite severe and damning.  Harris and the others thus paint a picture of faith as inherently irrational.  However, if someone can show that faith is not irrational, that faith and reason can work together, then these thinkers may still disagree about the existence of God, but there would be no basis for the sort of rhetoric of ignorance that has, thus far, been articulated so passionately by these thinkers.

 

Relevance for Today

This picture of Christianity, and any religion, as inherently irrational is the prevailing theme among contemporary critiques of faith.  However, these critiques go further to criticize Christianity as being detrimental and even destructive to the advancement of humanity.  This is particularly visible in the title and subtitle to Hitchens book, God is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything.  These contemporary comments bear a striking similarity to some of the criticism leveled in Paris in the thirteenth century.  There seems to be a prevailing attitude of scientism, especially in Dawkins, which parallels the medieval proposition that states, “Only the philosophers are the wise men of this world.”[lxv] This is especially the case in his rhetorical question, “What expertise can theologians bring to deep cosmological questions that scientists cannot?”[lxvi] This attitude amounts to a view that, in parallel to the previously mentioned proposition, “Only the scientists are the wise men of this world.”  Further comments from this entire contemporary group claiming the irrationality and ignorance of Christians parallels the medieval proposition, “That the Christian law impedes one from learning.”[lxvii] Thus, it seems that by studying Aquinas on this matter, it may be possible to address some of the concerns encountered today.  The important point is to show that reason is indeed in use within Christianity, and Aquinas may be able to do this, considering his healthy regard for both faith and the human faculty of reason.  For if religion in general, and Christianity in particular, are reasonable, then many of the critiques examined would have no bearing.  If Christianity is reasonable then it cannot “sap the intellect” [lxviii] nor could it be “degraded nonsense.”[lxix] Aquinas, as a thinker who has previously shed light on the issue, can continue to do so through his famous synthesis of faith and reason.  His synthesis provides a starting point from which one may be able to refine further his thought in light of the vast stretch of human thinking that has transpired from Aquinas’ time to today, and show that religion in general and Christianity in particular are not irrational.  This is the ongoing project of this author—to use the rich resources found in Thomas Aquinas, along with his method of synthesis that takes philosophy seriously yet stays true to Christian scripture and the works of Augustine, to defend against the same types of anti-Christian and anti-faith comments that pervaded the air of the University of Paris during Aquinas’ time.

 

Works Cited

 

Aertsen, Jan A. "Aquinas's Philosophy in Its Historical Setting." In The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, edited by Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, viii, 302 p. Cambridge ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis.  In University Records and Life in the Middle Ages, edited by Lynn Thorndike. New York,: Columbia University Press, 1944.

Copleston, Frederick Charles. Aquinas. London and New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1955, 1991.

Dawkins, Richard. The God Delusion. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2006.

Gerrity, Benignus. Nature, Knowledge and God; an Introduction to Thomistic Philosophy. Milwaukee,: Bruce Pub. Co., 1947.

Harris, Sam. The End of Faith : Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason. 1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004.

Hitchens, Christopher. God Is Not Great : How Religion Poisons Everything. 1st ed. New York: Twelve, 2007.

Kretzmann, Norman, and Eleonore Stump. "Introduction." In The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, edited by Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, viii, 302 p. Cambridge ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Marrone, Steven P. "Medieval Philosophy in Context." In The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, edited by Arthur Stephen McGrade. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Martin, Michael. Atheism: A Philosophical Justification. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1990.

Mencken, H.L. H.L. Mencken on Religion. Edited by S.T. Joshi. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2002.

Parker, Francis H. Reason and Faith Revisited, The Aquinas Lecture. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1971.

Russell, Bertrand. Why I Am Not a Christian and Other Essays on Religion and Related Subjects. New York, NY: Touchstone, 1957.

Schachner, Nathan. The Mediaeval Universities. London: G. Allen & Unwin ltd., 1938.

Thomas. St. Thomas Aquinas and the Mendicant Controversies: Three Translations. Translated by John Proctor. Leesburg, Va.: Alethes Press, 2007.

Wippel, John F. Mediaeval Reactions to the Encounter between Faith and Reason, The Aquinas Lecture. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1995.

 

 

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[i] Benignus Gerrity, Nature, Knowledge and God; an Introduction to Thomistic Philosophy (Milwaukee,: Bruce Pub. Co., 1947), p 443.

[ii] Francis H. Parker, Reason and Faith Revisited, The Aquinas Lecture (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1971), p 1-2.

[iii] Frederick Charles Copleston, Aquinas (London and New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1955, 1991), p 72.

[iv] Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, "Introduction," in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p 5.

[v] Jan A. Aertsen, "Aquinas's Philosophy in Its Historical Setting," in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp 12 – 13.

[vi] Ibid., p 12.

[vii] Ibid., p 12.

[viii] Nathan Schachner, The Mediaeval Universities (London: G. Allen & Unwin ltd., 1938), p 56.

[ix] Aertsen, "Aquinas's...Historical Setting," p 13.

[x] Ibid., p 13.  See also John F. Wippel, Mediaeval Reactions to the Encounter between Faith and Reason, The Aquinas Lecture (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1995), p 13.

[xi] Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, "Paris Asks for the Bones and Unfinished Works of Aquinas, 1274 (Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, I, 504 - 505)," in University Records and Life in the Middle Ages, ed. Lynn Thorndike (New York,: Columbia University Press, 1944), p 98 – 100.

[xii] Aertsen, "Aquinas's...Historical Setting," pp 25 – 26.

[xiii] Ibid., p 20.

[xiv] Steven P. Marrone, "Medieval Philosophy in Context," in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, ed. Arthur Stephen McGrade (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p 32.

[xv] Schachner, The Mediaeval Universities, p 12.

[xvi] Ibid., p 12.

[xvii] Wippel, Mediaeval Reactions, p 8.

[xviii] Marrone, "Medieval Philosophy in Context," p 44.

[xix] Ibid., p 44.

[xx] Ibid., p 44.

[xxi] Copleston, Aquinas, p 65.

[xxii] Wippel, Mediaeval Reactions, p. 10.

[xxiii] Marrone, "Medieval Philosophy in Context," p 34.

[xxiv] Ibid., p 34.

[xxv] Ibid., p 26.

[xxvi] Ibid., p 43.

[xxvii] Wippel, Mediaeval Reactions, p 10.

[xxviii] Copleston, Aquinas, p 65.

[xxix] Aertsen, "Aquinas's...Historical Setting," p 22.

[xxx] Copleston, Aquinas, p 66.

[xxxi] Ibid., p 67.

[xxxii] Ibid., pp 67-68.

[xxxiii] Marrone, "Medieval Philosophy in Context," p 26.

[xxxiv] Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, "The Condemnation of 1210 (Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, I, 70)," in University Records and Life in the Middle Ages, ed. Lynn Thorndike (New York,: Columbia University Press, 1944), pp 26 – 27.

[xxxv] Ibid., p 26.  See also Wippel, Mediaeval Reactions, p 11.

[xxxvi] Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, "The Condemnation of 1210," p 26.

[xxxvii] Wippel, Mediaeval Reactions, p 11.

[xxxviii] Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, "The Books on Nature to Be Expurgated, 1231 (Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, I, 143 - 44)," in University Records and Life in the Middle Ages, ed. Lynn Thorndike (New York,: Columbia University Press, 1944), p 39 – 40.

[xxxix] Ibid., p 40.

[xl] Wippel, Mediaeval Reactions, p 12.

[xli] Ibid., p 14.  See also Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, "Thirteen Errors Condemned by Stephen, Bishop of Paris, 1270 (Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, I, 486 - 487)," in University Records and Life in the Middle Ages, ed. Lynn Thorndike (New York,: Columbia University Press, 1944), pp 80 – 81.

[xlii] Wippel, Mediaeval Reactions, p 14.

[xliii] Ibid., p 21.

[xliv] Ibid., p 22.

[xlv] Ibid., p 22.

[xlvi] Ibid., p 22.

[xlvii] Ibid., p 22.

[xlviii] Thomas, St. Thomas Aquinas and the Mendicant Controversies: Three Translations, trans. John Proctor (Leesburg, Va.: Alethes Press, 2007), pp 12 – 28.

[xlix] Wippel, Mediaeval Reactions, p 23.

[l] Ibid., p 26.  This may be a result of the burn orders associated with excommunication as noted in the condemnation of 1210.  See Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, "The Condemnation of 1210," pp 26 – 27.

[li] Schachner, The Mediaeval Universities, p 56.

[lii] H.L. Mencken, H.L. Mencken on Religion, ed. S.T. Joshi (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2002), p 125.

[liii] Ibid., p 109.

[liv] Bertrand Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian and Other Essays on Religion and Related Subjects (New York, NY: Touchstone, 1957), pp 21-22.

[lv] Ibid., p 30.

[lvi] Ibid., p 175.

[lvii] Michael Martin, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1990), pp 249 – 278.

[lviii] Ibid., p 277.

[lix] Ibid., p 249.

[lx] Ibid., p 249.

[lxi] Ibid., p 24.

[lxii] Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2006), p 284.

[lxiii] Christopher Hitchens, God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything, 1st ed. (New York: Twelve, 2007), p 11.

[lxiv] Sam Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004), p 223.

[lxv] Wippel, Mediaeval Reactions, p 21.

[lxvi] Dawkins, The God Delusion, p 56.

[lxvii] Wippel, Mediaeval Reactions, p 22.

[lxviii] Dawkins, The God Delusion, p 284.

[lxix] Ibid., p 249.