An essential component in the atheist argument that morality is not derived from God or the gods is the Euthyphro Dilemma, posed by Plato’s protagonist Socrates. As with all dilemmas, the Dilemma is an interrogative statement: do the gods (or God) choose what is good because it is good, or is what is good good because the gods (or God) have chosen it? For the religious believer, neither choice is acceptable, hence the question’s dilemmic nature. To affirm that the gods or God choose what is good because it is good is to establish an autonomous moral principle that has authority over the gods or God. This is a particularly acute challenge for theism which presents God as the absolute. To affirm that what is good is good because the gods or God have chosen it is to render morality arbitrary: what is good is whatever the gods or God have said it is. It is not my intention to examine the ways in which Christian philosophers have responded to the Dilemma. Rather, I propose that atheism has its own Euthyphro-style Dilemma if the source of morality, as prominent atheists assert, is human nature.